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Introduction
Courts have described patents as property rights in terms evoking
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause for nearly 200 years.1 To date,
1.

See, e.g., Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 234 (1876) (characterizing
patents as “[p]rivate property, [which] the Constitution provides, shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation . . .”); McClurg v.
Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843) (referring to patent protections as
“rights” when holding that Congress may not retroactively impair patent
scope granted under a prior statute); McKeever v. United States
(McKeever’s Case), 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 420–22 (Ct. Cl. 1878) (“[T]he framers of
the Constitution designed to place the work of the inventor among legal
rights, which . . . should become property in the eye of the law and be
respected as such by the government as by the citizen.”). Professor Mossoff
notes that McKeever’s failure to distinguish between common-law rights and
statutory rights may be “more the result of hyperbolic rhetoric and late-
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though, the Supreme Court has not definitively held that eminent
domain protections apply to patents. 2 Several recent developments
suggest that the issue is newly relevant. Despite holding that patents
are a “public franchise” that can be revoked in a non-Article III
proceeding, the Supreme Court’s decision in Oil States Energy Services
v. Greene’s Energy Group3 (“Oil States”) left open the possibility that
patents may be constitutional property interests under the Takings and
Due Process Clauses. 4 Further, the Court’s holding in Impression
Products v. Lexmark International 5 —that patented products sold
abroad have their patent rights exhausted6—has raised new legal argu–
ments in the pharmaceutical industry that federal import of patented
drugs sold abroad could amount to a taking without just compensation.7
In the scholarly literature, much of the Takings Clause and patents
analysis centers around whether patents should be classified as private
property rights on par with real property or whether they are more like
regulatory entitlements, in the form of a “public franchise.”8 I review
that scholarship in Part II(A). Lacking in the commentary, though, is
an in-depth analysis regarding the difference between protecting
patents with the Due Process Clause and protecting patents with the
Takings Clause. Indeed, much of the existing scholarship must be re-

nineteenth-century judicial formalism than of substantive patent and
constitutional doctrine.” Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private
Property: The Historical Protection of Patents under the Takings Clause, 87
B.U. L. Rev. 689, 707 (2007).
2.

See Christopher S. Storm, Federal Patent Takings, 2 J. Bus. Entre–
preneurship & L. 1, 2 (2008) (“Although the Patents Clause and the
Takings Clause have coexisted for over two hundred years, the Supreme
Court has never fully explained the relationship between patent law and
takings law.”).

3.

138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).

4.

Id. at 1379 (“[O]ur decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that
patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the
Takings Clause.”).

5.

137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).

6.

Id. at 1529.

7.

See Frederick M. Abbott, Legislative and Regulatory Takings of Intellectual
Property: Early Stage Intervention Against a New Jurisprudential Virus 2–
3 (Jan. 4, 2019) (unpublished article), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3346134 (explaining post-Impression Products reactions
in the pharmaceutical industry).

8.

See Adam Mossoff, Statutes, Common Law Rights, and the Mistaken
Classification of Patents as Public Rights, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 2591, 2594
(2019) (describing the debate between private and public rights in the
scholarly literature and in cases).
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evaluated in light of the Supreme Court’s treatment of patents in Oil
States.9
In this Note, I argue that patents are not entitled to Takings Clause
protection because of their post-Oil States status as “public
franchises.” 10 Nevertheless, patents are likely protected interests for
purposes of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.11 Part II(B) analyzes the Oil States opinion, examines
public franchises in another context, and reviews several of the relevant
cases that the Court cited in Oil States. In Part III, I analyze
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 12 the Supreme Court’s only Takings
Clause case that deals with intellectual property, to see how it may
influence the Court in a future patent case. Part IV reviews how the
Takings Clause has been applied to patents in lower courts.
I also argue here that patents are entitled to Due Process Clause
protection after the Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank 13 (“Florida Pre–
paid”). Thus, the adequacy of the remedy available for deprivation of
patent interests will be relevant to patent-related due process claims
against the federal government. I provide background on the currently
available remedy, 28 U.S.C. § 1498, in Part V. Finally, I argue in Part
VI that the Takings Clause should not apply to patents because of the
Oil States categorization of patents as public franchises, and I introduce
some of the arguments that parties may make in future litigation over
these issues.

II. Background: Patents as Public Franchises
This Part first reviews the status of the legal and scholarly
commentary regarding patents and their protection under the Fifth
Amendment.14 Then, I analyze the Oil States decision and its “public

9.

See Adam Mossoff, Institutional Design in Patent Law: Private Property
Rights or Regulatory Entitlement, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 921, 942–43 (2019)
(arguing that Oil States exhibits a “radical shift” in patent jurisprudence
away from private property rights).

10.

See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S.
Ct. 1365, 1375 (2018) (“Patents convey only a specific form of property
right—a public franchise.”).

11.

See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (opining that patents “are surely included within
the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State without due
process of law”).

12.

467 U.S. 986 (1984).

13.

527 U.S. 627 (1999).

14.

See infra Part II(A).
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franchise” approach to understanding the patent right. 15 With the
public-franchise approach established, this Part will review some of the
scant case law on the subject of public franchises in other contexts to
understand how the public-franchise approach may affect a future
Takings Clause claim for patents.16 Then, I analyze the cases the Oil
States opinion cites to narrow its holding—Florida Prepaid and James
v. Campbell17—by stipulating that it does not address whether patents
are property rights protected by the Due Process and Takings Clauses.18
A.

Scholarship on Patents as Constitutional Property

The jurisprudence19 and legal commentary20 that consider whether
patents are property entitled to Takings Clause protection leave the
answer mired in uncertainty.21 As an initial matter, patents must be
considered private property before Takings Clause protection can

15.

See infra Part II(B).

16.

See infra Part II(B)(1).

17.

104 U.S. 356 (1881).

18.

See infra Part II(B)(2)–(3).

19.

Compare Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (holding that patents are a “creature of federal law” and that the
Tucker Act thus gave no jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims to hear
claims alleging a patent taking under the Fifth Amendment), vacated, 672
F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (expressing no opinion on the status
of patents as property on rehearing en banc), with Oil States Energy Servs.,
LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018) (“[O]ur
decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not
property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or Takings Clause.”).

20.

Compare Justin Torres, The Government Giveth, and the Government
Taketh Away: Patents, Takings, and 28 U.S.C. § 1498, 63 N.Y.U. Ann.
Surv. Am. Law 315, 316 (2007) (arguing that patents are subject to the
Takings Clause), with Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property is Created Equal:
Why Modern Courts Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and
Why They Are Right to Do So, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1, 3 (2007)
(arguing that patents should not be subject to the Takings Clause).

21.

In the first instance, it is not immediately apparent that patents—as
intellectual “property”—could even be “property” for Fifth Amendment
purposes. The Court has tended to hold, however, that non-tangible
interests are “property.” See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1003 (1984) (“It is conceivable that [the term ‘property’ in the Taking
Clause] was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing
with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the
other hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote
the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing,
as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the
construction given the phrase has been the latter.”) (quoting United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945)).
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adhere.22 Further complicating the picture is the frequent invocation of
Takings Clause language when describing cases of federal government
infringement under 28 U.S.C. § 149823 or in nineteenth-century case
law,24 both of which would appear to resolve the issue in favor of private
property protection. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also
repeatedly referred to patent rights as dependent on statutory grants—
meaning the statutes create rights which did not exist at common law,
evoking a public franchise or non-private-property solution.25 Justice
Thomas adopted this view in his Teva Pharmaceuticals USA v. Sandoz26
dissent, pushing back on the movement to create stronger private
property protections in patents.27
22.

U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001 (calling it a
“basic axiom” that property interests under the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause are determined by independent sources of law outside the Cons–
titution); Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1212–13
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that a Takings Clause claimant must first
establish a property interest that the Takings Clause can protect); Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (arguing that the Court
looks to understandings of property independent of the Constitution to decide
which interests are protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments);
Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical
Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 689, 700
(2007) (explaining that patents must be “property” before patent owners can
bring suit).

23.

See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1283
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The patentee takes his patent . . . subject to the
government’s eminent domain rights to obtain what it needs from manu–
facturers . . . . The government has graciously consented [in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498] to be sued . . . for reasonable and entire compensation . . . .”);
Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (explaining
that eminent domain is the basis for a suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1498); Irving
Air Chute Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 633, 635 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (same).

24.

See, e.g., James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881) (arguing in dicta
that a government user of a patent must grant the patentee “just compen–
sation” in the same way that the government must compensate for its use
of private land).

25.

See, e.g., Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (“[T]he right of
property which a patentee has in his invention . . . is derived altogether
from . . . statutory provisions . . . .”); Graham v. John Deere Co. of
Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“The patent monopoly was not designed
to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries.”); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 n.5 (1964) (“Patent rights
exist only by virtue of statute.”).

26.

135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).

27.

Id. at 848 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no “core”
property right in a patent because the patent’s scope depends entirely on
statutory grant).
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But despite these cases, the nature of patents—as private property
rights versus public franchises—has been the subject of much academic
debate, a debate which Oil States appears to have resolved in large
part.28 Unfortunately, the distinction is not only unclear in the case law,
but it also involves competing meanings of “rights,” “privileges,” and
“franchises.”29 Generally, though, a public franchise is a grant of rights
involving “means to carry out public ends,” existing only to promote
those ends.30 A true private property right, on the other hand, would
exist—according to Lockean theory—without political involvement.31
Many of the competing arguments were raised in briefing before the
Court for the Oil States case. Perhaps the staunchest proponent of pat–
ents-as-constitutional-property is Professor Adam Mossoff. Professor
Mossoff, in an amici brief for the Oil States case, sets out arguments for
protecting patents as typical private property under the Takings Clause
and the Due Process Clauses.32 He argued that the Court had frequently
invoked common law property concepts when discussing patents and
cited real property cases as precedent for defining patent rights. 33
Additionally, he pointed to the Horne v. Department of Agriculture
Court’s partial reliance on James v. Campbell for the idea that patents,
and indeed all personal property, were subject to the Takings Clause,34
despite the fact that Professor Mossoff has elsewhere argued that the
Takings Clause portion of James v. Campbell was dicta.35
Elsewhere, Professor Mossoff has argued that the historical
treatment of patents in both the Supreme Court and the Court of
Claims shows that patents were “enthusiastically” protected under the
Takings Clause.36 “Substantively and rhetorically, nineteenth-century
courts believed that patents were a species of property.”37 Though the
historical cases did not all point towards the conclusion that patents
28.

See infra Part II(B).

29.

See Mossoff, Statutes, supra note 8, at 2594–99 (describing the differences).

30.

Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev.
559, 567 (2007).

31.

Id.

32.

Brief of 27 Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3,
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365 (2018) (No. 16-712).

33.

Id. at 6–17.

34.

Id. at 2–3 (citing Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) and
James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)).

35.

Mossoff, supra note 1, at 708; see also infra text accompanying notes 134–
136.

36.

See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 691.

37.

Id. at 701.
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are constitutionally protected private property, Mossoff argues that the
arc of the jurisprudence was apparent; “patents were private property
rights secured under the Constitution.”38
Proponents of the public franchise approach to patents, on the
other hand, point out that patents are entirely bound by statutory
grant and were non-existent at common law.39 Neither did patent rights
depend on state law.40 Additionally, several amici in Oil States pointed
out that the role the Executive branch played in granting patents at
the founding indicates that patents are closer to public rights than
private ones.41 Further, because patents derive all their boundaries from
positive statutory law rather than common law, some amici argued that
adjudicating them in an Article I proceeding would be appropriate.42
Patents are also subject to maintenance fees, which amici argued were
for the “privilege of keeping patent rights”—yet another analogy to a
public monopoly granted as a privilege, not as of right.43 Finally, amici
argued that land analogies were inapt, because the closest examples
were leases on federal public land; such leases are subject to admin–
istrative cancelling, much like patents may be revoked in inter partes
review.44
Patents-as-constitutional-property skeptics also take issue with proconstitutional-property historical claims as to patent treatment.
Contrary to Professor Mossoff’s understanding that early court
treatment of patents under the Takings Clause is persuasive, Professor
Thomas Cotter argues that most, if not all, of these early statements
about patents can be classified as dicta.45
38.

Id. at 710–11.

39.

Brief for 72 Professors of Intellectual Property Law as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 3, 6, Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16712).

40.

Id. at 4.

41.

Brief of the Internet Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 6, Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16-712).

42.

Id. at 8.

43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 10. Federal leases are also limited in time and subject to admin–
istrative payments, as patents are limited in time and require maintenance
fees. Id.

45.

See Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate
the Fifth Amendment?, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 529, 543 (1998) (“The difficulty
lies in determining whether to take at face value the Court’s charac–
terization, in James and subsequent cases, of unauthorized government uses
of patents as takings.”). Though Professor Cotter is among the scholars
concerned about the expanding “propertization” of intellectual property
rights, he does not outright reject the idea that the Takings Clause could
apply to patents. Id. at 564. Even if the protections do apply, however,
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Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Oil States the debate has
remained largely academic and absent from the courts; 46 now, the
debate over the role of patents as property in takings doctrine is once
again relevant.47
B.

Patents as a Public Franchise: Oil States

The pivotal Oil States case involved Oil States’ patent for a method
of protecting equipment during hydraulic fracturing. 48 Oil States
brought suit against Greene’s Energy Group for patent infringement;
as part of its defense, Greene’s Energy petitioned the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (“PTAB”) to initiate inter partes review of the patent
on the grounds that the patent was invalid.49 The PTAB found that
Professor Cotter believes that the cases where this is important will be few
and far between. Id. at 565.
46.

For criticism of the Oil States decision on various grounds, see generally
Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court Tackles Patent Reform: Inter
Partes Review Under the AIA Undermines the Structural Protections by
Article III Courts, 19 Fed. Soc’y Rev. 188 (2018). Professor Epstein
argues that Oil States represents a “comprehensive vision of patent law
that couples weak property rights with high-level administrative control,”
involving a right-leaning narrowing of patent rights from Justice Thomas
and a left-leaning empowerment of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
from Justice Breyer. Id. at 188.

47.

The Federal Circuit subsequently relied in part on Oil States’s public
franchise approach to patents in holding that sovereign immunity does
not apply to inter partes review of patents in some instances. See Saint
Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity did not apply for inter
partes review proceedings), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019); Regents
of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(holding that state sovereign immunity did not apply to inter partes
review proceedings), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 908 (2020).

48.

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1372.

49.

Id. Inter partes review involves reconsidering the validity of a patent. Id. at
1371. The America Invents Act (“AIA”) introduced inter partes review in
2012. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2018).
Any person other than the patentholder may petition and argue to cancel
patent claims. Id. § 311(a). The only grounds available to challenge validity
are lack of novelty and obviousness. Id. § 311(b). Review is adversarial; the
patent owner is entitled to participate and defend validity. Id. § 316. The
petitioner has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the patent claims are invalid and should not have issued. Id. § 316(e). The
PTAB, sitting as a three-member panel, conducts the administrative
review, id. § 316(c), and issues a final decision terminating the proceedings,
id. § 317. Any dissatisfied party can appeal the Board’s decision to the
Federal Circuit. Id. § 319. In the Federal Circuit, the Board’s factual
determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence and legal conclusions
are reviewed de novo. See Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
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the subject matter of the patents lacked novelty and were thus
unpatentable.50 As part of its appeal, Oil States argued that the entire
inter partes review system was unconstitutional, asserting that only an
Article III court could revoke an issued patent.51
The Supreme Court rejected this argument by differentiating
between public franchises and private rights—and held that patents are
a grant of the former that are subject to post-grant adjudication in an
Article I proceeding.52 The Oil States dissent, meanwhile, characterized
patents as “inchoate property” that, if withdrawn by the executive
branch, could be subject to due process protection.53 One author des–
cribes the split between the Oil States majority and dissenting opinions
as embodying the academic debate between the “patents-as-cons–
titutional-property” versus the “patents-as-public-franchises” camps.54
This split is reflected in many of the amici briefs before the Court.55
For the majority, Justice Thomas noted that the distinction
between public rights and private rights has not been clear in the
Court’s jurisprudence.56 He explained that public rights are those that
arise from interactions between the executive or legislative branch in
the performance of their constitutional duties.57 Granting a patent thus
involves public rights because the executive branch, pursuant to its
Article I authority to grant patents, effectively takes a right from the
public—the right to practice a given invention—and bestows it upon
an inventor.58
Where public rights are involved, Justice Thomas wrote, Congress
has “significant latitude” to allow non-Article III courts to resolve
50.

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1372.

51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 1373. Justice Thomas’s public-rights approach pulls from his dissent
in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 342
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

53.

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1384 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Evans v.
Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813)). Professor Epstein shares this
view of patents as property rights on par with traditional property rights
like real property. See Epstein, supra note 46, at 122–23 (2018).

54.

See Greg Reilly, Congress’s Power to Define Patent Rights (2019)
(forthcoming), https://www.law.msu.edu/ipic/workshop/2019/papers/reilly
-power-patent-rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6PA-6TEK].

55.

See supra Part II(A).

56.

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373. This statement directly conflicts with the
Court’s opinion in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, where the
Court called the distinction between public and private rights “well
established.” 564 U.S. 162, 172 (2011).

57.

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373.

58.

Id.

895

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
Patents, Public Franchises, and Constitutional Property Interests

issues.59 Inter partes review, then, invokes the public-rights doctrine
because it deals with the same issue as when the Patent and Trademark
Office first considers a patent application—whether the invention is
patentable—which is an issue of granting a public right.60 Further, the
Court had previously held that other public franchises—such as permits
to build toll bridges, railroads, and telegraph lines—may be qualified
by Congress’s right to modify or revoke that franchise. 61 Thus, the
PTAB could constitutionally reconsider the grant of a patent.
The dissent, meanwhile, rejected the majority’s arguments largely
on grounds of historical practice,62 but also took issue with character–
izing patents as a mere public franchise. Justice Gorsuch referred to
patents as “inchoate property”63 that give “as good a title as the farmer
holds his farm and flock.”64 Patentees are entitled to the patent “as a
matter of right.”65 Justice Gorsuch also argued that, assuming patents
were indeed public franchises, these franchises should be treated “quite
differently from ordinary public franchises” because the Patent Clause
was meant to give patents more weight than the that given to mere
monopolies once granted by the English crown; most other non-patent
public franchises resembled such English monopolies.66
1.

Public Franchises in Other Contexts

In light of the Oil States approach to patents as public franchises,
the treatment of other types of public franchises merits discussion for
comparability. The case law and academic scholarship on public
franchises is sparse,67 so the cases that Oil States cites are of particular
importance. Though these cases could be indicative of how the Supreme
Court may treat takings claims for patents, there were still several
members of the Court who believed that public franchises in patents
59.

Id. The Court held in Stern v. Marshall that “public rights” can be
adjudicated outside of Article III courts. 564 U.S. 462, 488 (2011).

60.

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374. The Court acknowledged that inter partes
review differs from the grant of a patent because inter partes review occurs
after the patent issues—but argued that the distinction is irrelevant because
patent claims are granted explicitly subject to inter partes review. Id.

61.

Id. at 1375.

62.

Id. at 1381–83 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

63.

Id. at 1384 (quoting Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813)).

64.

Id. at 1384 (quoting Hovey v. Henry, 12 F. Cas. 603, 604 (C.C.D. Mass.
1846)).

65.

Id. (quoting James v Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)).

66.

Id. at 1385.

67.

Id. at 1373 (majority opinion) (noting that the Court has not been con–
sistent or definitive about the distinction between public rights and private
rights).

896

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
Patents, Public Franchises, and Constitutional Property Interests

should be treated differently than the typical public franchise.
Accordingly, the treatment of other public franchises may not be
dispositive for future cases.68
One such case, Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States,69 dealt with
a franchise that Congress granted to the Louisville Bridge Company to
build and own a bridge across the Ohio river.70 The Secretary of War
later informed the owners that the bridge did not leave enough width
at the river for navigation—even though the bridge became wider than
even the act of Congress had originally prescribed.71
During litigation over the issue, Louisville Bridge asserted that
Congress’s grant of the franchise was an “irrevocable franchise,” such
that requiring Louisville Bridge to remove or alter the structure would
be a taking without just compensation. 72 The Court disagreed,
conceiving of the public franchise right as one limited wherever it
conflicts with the public right—and acts of Congress later limiting the
franchise are such an instance.73
If the analogy to bridge franchises holds—particularly on the facts
present in Louisville Bridge—it would suggest that patents are not
entitled to Takings Clause protection. One of the strongest cases for
applying eminent domain jurisprudence to patents would be Congress
either directly revoking or directly re-assigning a patent, because that
would entirely deprive the patentee of any interest in the patent.74 In
Louisville Bridge, though, the Court held that the franchise must yield
to the will of Congress.75 Though it is not entirely clear that this would
defeat Takings Clause claims for patents, it certainly gives reason for
pause.
In addition to evoking non-patent public franchise doctrine, the Oil
States Court’s approach to patents as a public right or public franchise
appears to be a revival of an old approach in the Supreme Court’s
68.

See id. at 1385 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

69.

242 U.S. 409 (1917).

70.

Id. at 414.

71.

Id. at 414–15.

72.

Id. at 416. Louisville Bridge further argued that Congress must exercise
its commerce-clause authority to require the bridge’s removal in the first
place. Id.

73.

Id. at 417. See also Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U.S. 470, 480 (1881)
(“Congress, which alone exercises the legislative power of the government, is
the constitutional protector of foreign and inter-state commerce. . . . [A]ll
grants of special privileges, affecting so important a branch of governmental
power, ought certainly to be strictly construed. . . . Every doubt should be
resolved in favor of the government.”).

74.

See infra Part V.

75.

Louisville Bridge, 242 U.S. at 417.
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patent doctrine. The principal case Thomas cites as supporting the
patents-as-public-franchise approach is Seymour v. Osborne,76 a case
from 1871.77 In Seymour, the Court referred to patents being “as much
entitled to protection as any other property, consisting of a franchise.”78
A patent, according to the Seymour Court, is not intended to give the
owner a “true” monopoly—instead, patents are public franchises
sanctioned by Congress.79
The famous case Gayler v. Wilder80 also emphasizes the role that
Congress plays in the patent regime such that patents are more like
public rights than private ones, though it does not explicitly invoke
public franchises. In that case, Chief Justice Taney notes that the
patent monopoly, such as it is, exists subject to Congress’s regulation.81
“[The patent monopoly] is created by the act of Congress; and no rights
can be acquired in it unless authorized by statute, and in the manner
the statute prescribes.”82 Oil States favorably cites Gayler v. Wilder for
the idea that “a patent can confer only the rights ‘that the statute
prescribes.’”83

76.

78 U.S. 516, 533 (1871).

77.

As the Oil States Court notes, public franchise language from Seymour is
cited favorably in the much more recent Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,
525 U.S. 55, 63–64 (1998). Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy
Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373–74 (2018); see also Crown & Die Tool Co.
v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40 (1923) (citing Chief Justice
Taney’s public franchise language favorably).

78.

Seymour, 78 U.S. at 533.

79.

Id.

80.

51 U.S. 477, 493 (1850).

81.

Id. at 494. Though Chief Justice Taney refers to the patent grant as a
monopoly, this is not necessarily inconsistent with Seymour’s approach.
In fact, Seymour is best understood as providing that the patent monopoly
is not absolute—it is subject to congressional limitations. See Seymour,
78 U.S. at 533.

82.

Gayler, 51 U.S. at 494. This language is cited favorably by the Supreme
Court much more recently in Pfaff v. Wells Elecs. Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63–
64 (1998). Additionally, both Gayler and Pfaff are cited as supporting the
idea that patents are a public franchise in Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373–
74.

83.

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1375 (quoting Gayler, 51 U.S. at 494.) Similarly,
in an early copyright case, the Court noted that copyrights and patent
rights did not exist at common law, so Congress has wide latitude to tailor
those rights. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 663–64 (1834) (“No one
can deny that when the legislature are about to vest an exclusive right in
an author or an inventor, they have the power to prescribe the conditions
on which such right shall be enjoyed . . . .”).
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The Oil States Court thus emphasizes that the only rights conferred
by public franchises are those given by statute. 84 The patent code
explicitly provides that patents have personal property attributes
“[s]ubject to the provisions of this title,” and the Title—Title 35—
qualifies the grant of the patent as subject to inter partes review.85
Thus, the rights conferred by the patent are subject to possible revo–
cation by inter partes review.86 This reflects a longstanding idea that
the only rights that patentees have are the rights Congress confers.87
Though the public franchise language may appear to answer
questions about the property rights conferred by patents, the Oil States
opinion stipulates that its holding does not implicate the status of
patents in the eminent domain context.88 Citing Florida Prepaid89 and
James v. Campbell,90 Justice Thomas writes that “our decision should
not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for
purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.” 91 This
statement may simply clarify the limitations of the Court’s holding
rather than suggest that patents are indeed property rights for takings
doctrine purposes. Justice Thomas’ choice in cited precedent, however,
suggests that the Court may be sympathetic to the claim.92
2. Florida Prepaid

The Oil States opinion cites Florida Prepaid to support the
narrowness of the opinion’s reach, particularly as not answering
84.

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373–74.

85.

Id. at 1375 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2018)).

86.

Id. at 1373.

87.

See Motion Pictures Pats. Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
517 (1917) (calling Congress “the source of all rights under patents”);
Gayler, 51 U.S. at 494 (“[The patent] is created by the act of Congress; and
no rights can be acquired in it unless authorized by statute, and in the
manner the statute prescribes.”); Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 592 (“[I]t has never
been pretended by any one, either in this country or in England, that an
inventor has a perpetual right, at common law, to sell the thing invented.”)

88.

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379.

89.

527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999).

90.

104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881).

91.

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379.

92.

The dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch also favorably quotes language
from a late-1800s case that indicates receptivity to the idea that patents
have traditional property characteristics—including, apparently, the right
to compensation in eminent domain actions against patents. Id. at 1384
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). “Allowing the Executive to withdraw a
patent . . . ‘would be to deprive the applicant of his property without due
process of law . . . .’” Id. (quoting McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v.
Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 612. (1898)).
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whether patents are entitled to Due Process or Takings Clause protec–
tion.93 Florida Prepaid dealt with the constitutionality of Congress’s
abrogation of state sovereign immunity in patent infringement suits.94
In 1999, Congress enacted the Patent Remedy Act to “clarify that
States . . . are subject to suit in Federal court by any person for
infringement of patents.”95
Prior to the Patent Remedy Act, the Federal Circuit had declined
to interpret the patent code, by itself, as an abrogation of state
sovereign immunity for patent claims.96 After the Patent Remedy Act’s
adoption, however, a new avenue for suit against state entities was
available. One such suit came from College Savings Bank. College
Savings held a patent for its financing methodology of college tuition
funds.97 The bank brought a patent infringement suit against Florida
Prepaid—a subsidiary of the Florida government—which ran a similar
tuition savings program.98
Florida Prepaid moved to dismiss the action on the basis that it
enjoyed sovereign immunity from patent infringement lawsuits, arguing
that Congress had failed to validly abrogate this immunity in the
Patent Remedy Act.99 College Savings, on the other hand, rested its
argument on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives
93.

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379 (citing Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999)). In the recent case
Allen v. Cooper, oral argument frequently turned to whether Florida Prepaid
must be overruled in a case involving a waiver of sovereign immunity for
copyright infringement. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, Allen v.
Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2019) (No. 18-887). Petitioner also argued that the
Takings Clause could serve as a basis for Congress’s abrogation of sovereign
immunity, which could also apply to patents and overrule Florida Prepaid
on other grounds. Id. at 17–18. Petitioner repeatedly referred to copyrights
as “private property rights,” and discussed patents. Id. at 16. Justice Alito
asked specifically about takings. Id. at 44. That could serve as a starting
point for patent infringement and takings cases.

94.

527 U.S. at 630 (1999).

95.

Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L.
102-560, preamble, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992). Congress adopted this act in
response to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Chew v. California, 893 F.2d
331, 336 (Fed. Cir. 1989), where the court held that the patent laws as they
stood did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Florida
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 632.

96.

Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 632.

97.

Id. at 630–31.

98.

Id. at 631.

99.

Id. at 633. This argument stems from the decision in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, where the Court held that Congress had not validly
abrogated state sovereign immunity as to suit by Native American tribes.
517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).
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Congress the authority to enforce the Due Process Clause.100 Here, that
meant that Congress could validly abrogate sovereign immunity to
protect patents—so long as patents were protectable property interests
under the Due Process Clause.101
The district court denied Florida Prepaid’s motion to dismiss,102
and the Federal Circuit affirmed on the grounds that Congress had
clearly expressed its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity and
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress that
power. 103 The Federal Circuit further reasoned that patents are
property entitled to Due Process protection, so Congress may legislate
to protect the property rights of patentholders—waiving state sovereign
immunity being one way to do so.104
The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed. Congress had, in part,
rested its authority to enact the Patent Remedy Act on its Article I
powers, either through the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause.105
The Supreme Court noted that Congress’s Article I powers are insu–
fficient to waive state sovereign immunity under any circumstances
after its ruling in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,106 and further
found that the remedy provided by the Patent Remedy Act exceeds
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment authority because the record was
insufficient to support the broad waiver of immunity.107 According to
the Court’s City of Boerne v. Flores108 precedent, remedial legislation
that seeks to vindicate Fourteenth Amendment interests must identify
an “evil” or “wrong.” 109 Though Congress had identified a wrong—
patent infringement by states without remedy due to sovereign
immunity—the record before Congress showed little to no indication
that state infringement was actually a problem worthy of federal
intervention.110
100. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 633.
101. Id.
102. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F.
Supp. 400, 401 (D.N.J. 1996).
103. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d
1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
104. Id. at 1348–50.
105. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635–36.
106. 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996).
107. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635–37, 639–40.
108. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
109. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530,
532).
110. Id. at 640–41. Indeed, the bill’s sponsor explicitly stated that there was no
evidence at all of a widespread state infringement issue. Id. at 641. The House
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Though the Court appeared to have dispensed with the broad
waiver of sovereign immunity, College Savings also argued that when a
state infringes a patent and then claims sovereign immunity from suit,
that state takes the patentee’s property without just compensation.111
Florida Prepaid asserted that patents are property interests created
under Congress’s Article I powers and that Congress may not create a
property right and then invoke Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to protect that same right.112
The Court declined to analyze College Savings’ Takings Clause
claim because Congress had not identified the Fifth Amendment as
grounds for its authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity.113 The
Court did, however, agree that College Savings might have recourse
through due process. The Court opined that “[p]atents . . . have long
been considered a species of property.”114 Because patents are property,
the Court noted that the Due Process Clause protects them from State
deprivation without due process of law.115 “[I]f the Due Process Clause
protects patents, we know of no reason why Congress might not
legislate against their deprivation without due process under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”116
Report identified only two total patent infringement suits against states. Id.
at 640. This put the Patent Remedy Act in stark contrast with the sort of
remedial legislation upheld in City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525–27, where
there was a “pattern of constitutional violations” and an “undisputed record
of racial discrimination” in the context of voting rights. Florida Prepaid, 527
U.S. at 640; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 315–
16, 333–34 (detailing a pattern of racial discrimination that justified remedial
legislation).
111. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641. It is interesting to note that the United
States declined to defend the Patent Remedy Act on Takings Clause grounds
but did agree with College Savings that Due Process Clause interests were
at stake. Id. at 642.
112. Id. at 642.
113. Id. at 642 n.7 (“There is no suggestion in the language of the statute itself,
or in the House or Senate Reports of the bill which became the statute, that
Congress had in mind the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend–
ment. Since Congress was so explicit about invoking its authority under
Article I and its authority to prevent a State from depriving a person of
property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, we
think this omission precludes consideration of the Just Compensation
Clause as a basis for the Patent Remedy Act.”).
114. Id. at 642. The Court engages in admittedly little analysis of patents as
property, relying on two 19th-century cases for the proposition. If the Court
were to take up the question today, the question would likely be complicated
by the Oil States public franchise approach, which the Florida Prepaid
Court did not consider. See supra Part II.
115. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642.
116. Id.
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Despite holding that patents may be protected as property under
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Court pointed out
that a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest, by itself, is
not an unconstitutional act.117 The deprivation must occur without due
process of law; here, that would occur “only where the State provides
no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners.”118
Again, Congress evidenced almost no consideration of the adequacy of
available state remedies, and the little consideration afforded was
largely about the inconvenience of state remedies versus federal
remedies.119 Thus, the legislation did not truly seek to remedy extensive
deprivations of rights that would justify the use of Section 5 power.120
With a remedy out of proportion to the problem as evidenced in the
record, the Patent Remedy Act was not a constitutional exercise of
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment authority.121
The Court in Oil States cites the portion of Florida Prepaid that
refers to patents as “a species of property” that is “surely included
within the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State
without due process of law.”122 The specific language used in Oil States,
however, does not make clear whether the Court considers the status
of patents as property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
settled law—settled in the sense that patents are indeed entitled to
protection under both amendments—or whether the holding merely
does not reach that question. “Finally, our decision should not be
misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes
of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.”123 The ambiguity in
this sentence suggests that the area is ripe for litigation. It appears,
though, that Florida Prepaid stands for the proposition that patents
are property for purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due

117. Id. at 642–43 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).
118. Id. at 643.
119. Id. at 644. Additionally, the Court noted that negligent government actions
do not “deprive” a person of their property without Due Process. Id. at 645.
Patent infringement is a strict liability regime—requiring no knowledge or
intent, except with respect to damages—and Congress did not adequately
address evidence suggesting that states were often only negligent, if not
completely innocent, infringers. Id.
120. Id. at 646 (“[T]he record at best offers scant support for Congress’s con–
clusion that States were depriving patent owners of property without due
process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in federal-court patent
actions.”).
121. Id. at 645–48 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526, 530–33).
122. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1379 (2018); Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642.
123. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379.
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Process Clauses—though that conclusion may be undermined by the
opinion’s lack of thorough analysis as to the property interest.
But protection as a property interest for Due Process Clause
purposes does not guarantee protection as a property interest under the
Takings Clause.124 Given that the Court in Florida Prepaid explicitly
refused to consider whether the Takings Clause supported a sovereign
immunity waiver for patent infringement suit—and thus did not
consider whether patents are property for Takings Clause purposes125—
the Oil States opinion was likely relying on Florida Prepaid for the idea
that patents are protectable interests under the Fourteenth Amend–
ment Due Process Clause. That leaves the Court’s citation to James v.
Campbell 126 as the only support for the idea that patents could be
protected by the Takings Clause.
3. James v. Campbell

In addition to citing Florida Prepaid as suggesting that patents are
property under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Oil States majority
cites to James v. Campbell, likely for the proposition that patents are
potentially deserving of Takings Clause protection. 127 In that case,
Campbell sued to enjoin the Post Office from using Campbell’s
patented letter-stamping technology.128 The Supreme Court’s opinion
opens with language strongly evoking eminent domain jurisprudence:
That the government of the United States when it grants letterspatent for a new invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon
the patentee an exclusive property [right] which cannot be
appropriated or used by the government itself, without just
compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without
compensation land which has been patented to a private pur–
chaser, we have no doubt.129

The Court also notes that many inventions deal with goods that
only a government may use—primarily weapons of war.130 The United
124. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 701 (“Identifying patents as property was
necessary in securing [patents] under the Takings Clause, but it was not
sufficient.”).
125. See supra text accompanying note 113.
126. 104 U.S. 356 (1881).
127. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379 (citing Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358).
128. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 357.
129. Id. at 357–58 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 358. “If [the government] could use such inventions without compen–
sation, the inventors could get no return at all for their discoveries and
experiments.” Id. This statement still holds some weight today. See Cotter,
supra note 45, at 556 (“The most obvious scenario under which a government
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States Government, unlike the English crown, did not reserve a right
to infringe patents as a matter of prerogative. 131 Though the
government may “take” a patent when it infringes, 132 the Campbell
Court writes that that does not conclude the case; there must be a court
with jurisdiction to vindicate the constitutional right to “just compen–
sation.”133
Relying on Campbell to support the patents-as-constitutionalproperty for Takings Clause purposes is likely to hold little water; this
part of the opinion was not part of its holding.134 Professor Mossoff
argues that this section was dicta, even though future cases and
commentators assumed that it was part of the holding, because the
Court resolved the case entirely on other grounds.135 The Court did not
have to reach the issue of damages for patent infringement—indeed, the
Court did not even reach the question of whether the Court of Claims
had jurisdiction—because the Court merely found the patent invalid.136
Further complicating the Takings Clause approach to patents is the
Supreme Court’s citation to Campbell in Horne v. Department of
Agriculture,137 where the Court held that personal property is entitled
to Takings Clause protection.138 To support that argument, the Court
use of intellectual property is likely to eliminate the property’s value to its
owner is when the government is the only potential purchaser of the right to
use the property—such as might be the case, for example, with regard to a
patented invention that is useful only for military purposes.”).
131. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358.
132. See infra Part IV for a discussion of whether the court is right to charac–
terize all patent infringements as takings.
133. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358–59. Congress later provided an avenue for remedy
with 28 U.S.C. § 1498. See infra Part V. Campbell considered this question
before the Court seemingly held that the Takings Clause is a self-executing
waiver of sovereign immunity. See First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987)
(rejecting the argument that the Fifth Amendment alone does not waive
sovereign immunity because “it is the Constitution that dictates the remedy
for interference with property rights amounting to a taking”). There is
currently a circuit split as to whether the Takings Clause is truly selfexecuting, with two circuits holding that it is self-executing, and at least
one circuit holding that it is not. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3,
Sammons v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1325 (2018) (mem), denying cert. to
860 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-795) (describing the circuit split).
134. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 357–59.
135. Mossoff, supra note 1, at 708 (“Since the Supreme Court resolved James
v. Campbell on the issue of the patent’s validity, it addressed only as dicta
whether patents were secured under the Takings Clause.”).
136. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 359, 383; see also Mossoff, supra note 1, at 708.
137. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
138. Id. at 2431.
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quoted James v. Campbell for the idea that a patent—as personal
property—could not be used by the government without just
compensation.139 This statement from Campbell, though, was still dicta
with respect to patents as private property entitled to Takings Clause
protection;140 thus, the Horne Court’s reliance on it does not create
much certainty as to patents.

III. Comparison to Trade Secrets:
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Though the Supreme Court has not yet considered whether patents
are entitled to Takings Clause protection, the Court has granted such
Fifth Amendment protection to another form of intellectual property—
trade secrets—in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.141 In light of Ruckel–
shaus, any argument that patents are not entitled to Takings Clause
protection will have to overcome comparisons to trade secrets.142
Ruckelshaus dealt with the constitutionality of several provisions of
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”),143
which required that all pesticides be registered with EPA.144 Subsequent
amendments to FIFRA, originally enacted in 1947,145 dealt with the
public disclosure of information the applicant turned over during the
registration process.146 Though applicants could designate some types
of information on applications as trade secrets or similarly sensitive
information in an attempt to protect it from public disclosure under an
early version of the law,147 the statute left EPA to use its judgment
about what to protect from public disclosure.148 EPA could disagree
with the applicant’s designation and propose to disclose it anyway.149
Another provision of the law allowed for subsequent applicants to
rely on data submitted by earlier applicants if the subsequent applicant
139. Id. at 2427.
140. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 708.
141. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
142. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Court compared and contrasted
patents with trade secrets when analyzing whether federal patent laws
preempted state trade secret laws that could have covered similar subject
matters. 416 U.S. 470, 480–83 (1974).
143. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 990 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1978)).
144. Id. at 991.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 992.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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offered to compensate the earlier applicant. 150 This amounted to a
mandatory license.151 Later amendments granted first applicants a 10year exclusivity period, after which subsequent applicants could use the
data for five years, subject to agreement on compensation or by nonreviewable binding arbitration.152 Finally, Congress amended FIFRA to
require disclosure of all health, safety, and environmental data to
“qualified requesters,” not subject to the non-disclosure of trade secrets
under the statute.153
Monsanto disclosed such health and environmental data in an
application for pesticide registration.154 Monsanto sought injunctive and
declaratory relief against FIFRA’s data-disclosure provisions, alleging
that they amounted to a taking of Monsanto’s property without just
compensation.155
The Supreme Court first noted that the nature of trade secrets
meant that any property interest would be extinguished if the
individual had publicly disclosed that information.156 Next, the Court
compared trade secrets to more traditional forms of property.157 Trade
secrets—like traditional property—can be assigned, form the res of a
trust, and pass to a bankruptcy trustee.158 The Court admitted that the
intangibility of trade secrets could complicate the analysis, but noted
that the Court had in the past interpreted the Takings Clause as
protecting other types of intangible interests—including liens and
contracts.159
Lastly, the Court argued that intangible property rights protected
by state law deserve Takings Clause protection.160 Because of the “basic
axiom”161 that property interests under the Takings Clause come from
“independent sources” such as state law,162 the Court appeared to make

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 994–95.
153. Id. at 995–96.
154. Id. at 998.
155. Id. at 998–99.
156. Id. at 1002.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1003.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1001.
162. Id. (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
161 (1980)).
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much of the fact that trade secrets are protected by Missouri law163—
the state of Monsanto’s headquarters.164 The Court thus held that trade
secrets like Monsanto’s are a property right secured by the Takings
Clause.165
Holding that trade secrets are property interests under the Takings
Clause did not end the matter. The Court then analyzed whether a
“taking” occurred when EPA disclosed Monsanto’s data or used it to
evaluate another party’s application.166 The Court applied its typical
factors for takings analyses; “the character of the government action,
its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investmentbacked expectations.” 167 For Ruckelshaus, the Court focused on
“reasonable investment-backed expectations” because that factor
weighed so heavily against a taking so as to foreclose further analysis.168
With some complication based on the date of the submitted data,
the Court held that Monsanto lacked any reasonable investment-backed
expectation in much of the data because Monsanto was aware, when it
submitted its data, that the EPA could publish it.169 “[A] voluntary
submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic
advantages of a registration can hardly be called a taking.”170 The Court
also considered whether using the data for other parties’ applications
was a “public use” in its eminent domain jurisprudence, but refused to
conclude that the publication provisions lacked a public use merely
because other private organizations would benefit.171 Congress believed
that there was a substantial public benefit in the form of streamlined
registrations and greater competition in the market, so it was within
Congress’s authority to regulate.172
Then, the Court analyzed Monsanto’s plea for injunctive relief. The
Court pointed out that such equitable relief is not available for takings
claims when there is a claim for just compensation available.173 Further,
163. Id. at 1003–04.
164. Id. at 997.
165. Id. at 1003–04.
166. Id. at 1004.
167. Id. at 1005 (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83
(1980)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1006–07.
170. Id. at 1007.
171. Id. at 1014.
172. Id. at 1015 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241–42
(1984)).
173. Id. at 1016.
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the Takings Clause does not require that the compensation come before
the taking,174 so aggrieved claimants could simply seek compensation
under the Tucker Act.175
Ruckelshaus could be relevant to a Takings Clause analysis for
patents because of its approach to defining the source of the property
interest for another form of intellectual property. 176 Though the
Ruckelshaus Court only mentioned state law as being a source of
property interests protectable by the Takings Clause, that is not to say
that there can be no other sources; it is possible that Congress may
create such an interest by statute, or even that the property interest in
patents already exists by virtue of the existing patent code.177

IV. Patents as Constitutional Property Interests
in Lower Courts
Though the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
applicability of the Takings Clause to patents, the Federal Circuit has
heard such argument before in two notable cases—Celgene Corporation
v. Peter178 and Zoltek Corporation v. United States.179
A.

Celgene Corporation v. Peter

Celgene partially involved a challenge to the AIA’s inter partes
review scheme.180 Celgene’s patent predated the AIA’s enactment, so
Celgene argued that retroactively reconsidering the patent’s validity
with a later-enacted scheme was an unconstitutional taking. 181 The
Patent Office—the appellee in the case—conceded that patents were
indeed valid Fifth Amendment property interests.182 Thus, the court did
no substantive analysis on the issue, quoting only the Fifth Amendment
and subsequently assuming that patents are valid property interests.183
The court ultimately held that applying inter partes review to pre-AIA
174. Id. (citing Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932)).
175. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982) (providing that the Court of
Federal Claims has jurisdiction over claims founded upon the Constitution
against the United States).
176. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 698 (explaining how Ruckelshaus can analogize
to patents).
177. See Isaacs, supra note 20, at 10; Storm, supra note 2, at 8.
178. 931 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
179. 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
180. Celgene, 931 F.3d at 1346.
181. Id. at 1358.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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patents is constitutional because inter partes review involves reexamining patent validity in a manner similar to other types of reexaminations that existed pre-AIA—accordingly patent owners must
expect that validity could generally be in question.184
B.

Zoltek Corporation v. United States

Zoltek I was an infringement case based on Lockheed Martin’s
alleged misuse of Zoltek’s patented technology for manufacturing F-22
fighter jets on behalf of the federal government.185 Zoltek first brought
its action under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), but the trial court held that
Zoltek was barred from doing so under § 1498(c) because the manu–
facture occurred in Japan. 186 The trial court then, however, allowed
Zoltek to amend its claims to allege a taking without just compensation
under the Tucker Act without relying on the infringement component
of § 1498.187
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that infringement claims
could not be asserted as Fifth Amendment takings claims under the
Tucker Act.188 One relevant case was Schillinger v. United States,189
where the Court held that government patent infringement was a tort
and thus claims based upon government infringement could not be
heard by the Court of Claims.190 Zoltek had argued that Schillinger had
been overruled in subsequent cases because they cast § 1498 claims as
takings claims, such that patent infringement by the federal govern–
ment amounts to the “taking” of a license to use the patent—not a
mere “tort” as contemplated by Schillinger.191 The court rejected the
argument that Schillinger was overruled because those cases did not
even mention the Tucker Act, and because—by allowing suit in the
Court of Claims for government infringement—28 U.S.C. § 1498 could
be interpreted as an attempt to give patent holders a remedy without
disturbing the non-takings framework from Schillinger.192 Finally, the
court noted that the only rights in patents are defined by independent

184. Id. at 1362–63.
185. Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek I), 442 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1350.
188. Id. The Tucker Act created jurisdiction for certain claims against the United
States in the Court of Claims. Id.
189. 155 U.S. 163.
190. Id. at 169.
191. Id. at 1351.
192. Id. at 1352.

910

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
Patents, Public Franchises, and Constitutional Property Interests

sources193 and that “patent rights are a creature of federal law,” such
that § 1498 would have been useless as a sovereign immunity waiver if
the Fifth Amendment truly authorized a takings claim for government
infringement.194
But Zoltek I was not the last word on patent infringement and
takings. Zoltek sought a transfer of the case to the Northern District of
Georgia, which the Court of Federal Claims granted.195 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit determined that the lower court had erred, and that
part of the lower court’s error stemmed from error in the Zoltek I case—
and so revisited Zoltek I en banc.196 With analysis not relevant to this
Note, the Federal Circuit reversed its Zoltek I opinion on the grounds
that Zoltek had adequately alleged infringement under § 1498(a) that
was not barred by § 1498(c)—which prohibits § 1498 claims when the
government’s use arises overseas.197 Because the case could be resolved
on § 1498(a) grounds, the en banc Federal Circuit declared that it
would reach no opinion on the possibility of a taking by the federal
government.198
Thus, even the specialized Federal Circuit does not have a clear
holding about the applicability of the Takings Clause to patents.
Though the Zoltek I opinion could be persuasive in its conclusions about
the Takings Clause and government infringement, the subsequent
Zoltek II en banc opinion explicitly reserved that question for another
case.199

193. Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984)). The Zoltek
I court also rejected the idea that Ruckelshaus had overruled Schillinger
because of its endorsement of takings for an intellectual property right,
given that the Court had not explicitly done so. Id. at 1352 n.3.
194. Id. at 1352.
195. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 409, 410–11 (2009).
196. Zoltek Corp. v. United States (Zoltek II), 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(en banc). Initially, the Federal Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc,
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006), but agreed
to hear it en banc after subsequent lower court decisions in the litigation.
197. Id. at 1327. Though it was reversed on other grounds, one commentator
takes issue with the Zoltek I court’s interpretation of Schillinger, given that
Schillinger was decided on jurisdictional grounds—and now, the Takings
Clause is a self-executing waiver of sovereign immunity, so no such
jurisdictional grounds need be present. See Isaacs, supra note 20, at 9–10.
Isaacs still concludes that Zoltek I’s holding was correct in declining to
protect patents under the Takings Clause. Id. at 5. For criticism of the
Zoltek I opinion that ultimately reaches the conclusion that patents should
be protected by the Takings Clause, see generally Torres, supra note 20.
198. Zoltek II, 672 F.3d at 1327.
199. See id.
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C.

Christy v. United States

The Court of Claims recently considered one such case and rejected
Takings Clause arguments. In Christy v. United States, 200 Christy
argued that the PTAB’s invalidation of its patent claims for an
ambient-air-backflushed-filter vacuum in inter partes review was a
taking of its property without just compensation. 201 This litigation
presented a different legal challenge to inter partes review than Oil
States, which focused on Article III and the Seventh Amendment.202
Christy relied heavily on the Oil States statement that the opinion
“should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property
for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.”203 The
Christy court first analyzed Schillinger and Zoltek I and found that,
though Zoltek I was vacated on other grounds, its Taking Clause
analysis still stands, and thus that patent rights could not be asserted
under the Takings Clause pursuant to Schillinger.204
Then, the Christy court emphasized that the statement in Oil States
merely defined the scope of the opinion’s holding.205 In fact, the Oil
States public franchise approach to patent rights encouraged the
Christy court to find that the Takings Clause was inapplicable to
patents. 206 Because patents are public franchises, “[they] are not
equivalent to private rights”—and because they are not private rights,
they are not property interests under the Takings Clause.207

V. Adequacy of the Government Infringement
Remedy: 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
Patentees arguing that their patent rights were deprived without
due process of law would likely have the makings of a legitimate claim
under Florida Prepaid, given that “[I]f the Due Process Clause protects
patents, we know of no reason why Congress might not legislate against
200. 141 Fed. Cl. 641 (2019).
201. Id. at 649–50.
202. See supra Part II(B).
203. Christy, 141 Fed. Cl. at 659 (quoting Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v.
Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018)).
204. Id. at 658.
205. Id. at 659.
206. Id. at 658–60. The court also rejected Christy’s comparison to Horne v.
Department of Agriculture because patents can be property rights without
being private property rights. Id. at 660. Further, patents are unlike the
raisins at issue in Horne because when patent rights are extinguished in inter
partes review, there is no title pass from the patentee to the government. Id.
207. Id.
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their deprivation without due process under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”208 As the Court noted in Florida Prepaid, however, a due
process analysis does not stop after determining that the property right
or interest in question is entitled to protection. 209 With state
infringement in mind, the Court held that the Constitution is only
violated if the available remedies for such infringement are either nonexistent or generally insufficient.210 In the context of federal government
infringement, then, the adequacy of the remedy—28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)—
merits analysis for due process claims. In this Section, I provide the
history of the statute and review its potential shortcomings. The
statute’s history and shortcomings may be relevant not only for testing
its adequacy for due process claims, but also because its development
may be related to how Congress saw the judiciary’s patent takings
jurisprudence develop.211
Rear Admiral Grace Murray Hopper is credited with popularizing
the adage “[i]t is much easier to apologize than it is to get
permission.”212 It is fitting, then, that contractors for the Navy infringed
a patent to build its Freedom class ships rather than seek a license213—
which led the Navy into a court-ordered payment of more than $7
208. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 642 (1999).
209. Id. at 642–43.
210. Id. at 643.
211. See infra text accompanying notes 236–244.
212. See Cliff Purington, Chris Butler & Sarah Fister Gale, Built
to Learn 171 (2003).
213. See FastShip, LLC v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 700, 709–10 (2019)
patent rather than infringing.
213. FastShip, 143 Fed. Cl. at 735 (vacated on other grounds, 968 F.3d 1335).
Without a requirement that the federal government engage in efforts to
license a patent before engaging in activity that effectively creates a com–
pulsory license, the 1918 Act appears to violate the United States’
international treaty obligations under Article 31 of the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (“TRIPS Agreement”).
See TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights art. 31, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
Failure to require ex ante licensing efforts has potentially significant
consequences. In Hitkansut LLC v. United States, 142 Fed. Cl. 341 (2019),
the court ordered the federal government to pay a plaintiff $4,387,899.54 in
attorneys’ fees, expert witness fees, and other costs for the government’s
infringement of his patent. 142 Fed. Cl. at 360–68. This amount is
staggering when compared to the mere $200,000 that the government was
ordered to pay for the infringement cause of action itself. Id. at 346. The
difference between the attorneys’ fees and infringement damages suggests
that the government could have saved a significant sum of money by
licensing the patent rather than infringing.

913

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
Patents, Public Franchises, and Constitutional Property Interests

million in attorney’s fees and costs. 214 The patentee in that case is
relatively lucky, because for much of the United States’ history, the
federal government could use a patented invention and claim sovereign
immunity to avoid liability altogether.215 Though the federal govern–
ment was still considered an infringer, 216 aggrieved patentees could
recover nothing. A patentee’s only true recourse was to seek an act of
Congress.217
This inequity led Congress to enact a statutory regime in 1910 to
allow patentees to recover damages for federal government infringe–
ment.218 Eight years later, Congress amended the statute to include
indemnity for federal government contractor infringement,219 which is a
common avenue for infringement. That provision allows an aggrieved
patentee to recover his “reasonable and entire compensation[,]”
including attorneys’ fees, whenever the patentee’s invention “is used or
manufactured by or for the United States.”220
Missing from the statute is any requirement that the federal
government attempt to license the invention from the patent holder
before infringing. Further missing is any mention of injunctive relief221—
214. FastShip, 143 Fed. Cl. at 735.
215. See, e.g., Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 167–69 (1894)
(holding that statutes creating the federal claims courts did not waive
sovereign immunity for infringement actions because they sound in tort,
which suits are expressly omitted from the Court of Claims’s jurisdiction);
United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 270–72 (1888) (quoting James v.
Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357–59 (1881)) (noting that, unless the Court of
Claims could exercise jurisdiction over federal government infringement
actions, a patentee’s only recourse against federal government infringe–
ment would be with Congress).
216. See Campbell, 104 U.S. at 357–58.
217. Id. at 359 (“If the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims should not be finally
sustained, the only remedy against the United States, until Congress
enlarges the jurisdiction of that court, would be to apply to Congress
itself.”).
218. See Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-305, 36 Stat. 851 (1910) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018)) (“1910 Act”); Crozier v. Fried.
Krupp Aktiengesell-Schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 303 (1912) (“The enactment of
the [1910 Act], we think, grew out of the operation of the prior statute law
concerning the right to sue the United States for the act of an officer in
infringing a patent as interpreted by repeated decisions of this court.”).
219. See Act of July 1, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-182, 40 Stat. 704, 705 (1918)
(amending the 1910 Act).
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2018).
221. See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(noting that injunctions, while available in ordinary infringement cases
under 35 US.C. § 283, are not available for actions against the federal
government under 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
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often called “the only remedy adequate” to protect the patentee’s right
to exclude222—which converts the statute into a compulsory license.223
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 provides that Congress shall have the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”224 This “exclusive Right” has long
been understood to be exclusive of not only a patentee’s fellow citizens,
but also of the federal government itself. The Court in James v.
Campbell noted that the federal government is bound by the
Constitution in the same way that private citizens are bound.225 That
makes the United States unlike England, where the government
retained an interest in granted patents.226 “The United States has no
such prerogative . . . by which it can reserve to itself, either expressly
or by implication, a superior dominion and use in that which it grants
by letters-patent to those who entitle themselves to such grants.”227
Though this language has subsequently been understood as dicta,228
recognizing that the federal government was still considered an infringer
likely influenced later developments with respect to § 1498.
The federal government may not have reserved a right to practice
patented technology, but recognizing the government as an infringer
was largely useless—Congress had not waived federal sovereign immun–
ity for patent infringement, leaving patentees without a remedy.229 Even
the Tucker Act of 1887, 230 in which Congress waived sovereign

222. See Herbert F. Schwartz, Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Suits,
112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1025, 1042 (1964).
223. See Craig A. Nard, The Law of Patents 354 (4th ed. 2017) (explaining
that the lack of injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 “means that, as a
practical matter, the government can indirectly invoke a compulsory
license.”).
224. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
225. 104 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1881) (“That the government of the United States
when it grants letters-patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts,
confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention
which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without
just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without
compensation land which has been patented to a private purchaser, we have
no doubt.”); see also United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 270–272 (1888)
(affirming the Campbell approach).
226. Id. at 358.
227. Id.
228. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 709.
229. Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358–59.
230. 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2018)).
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immunity as to some claims against the federal government,231 provided
no relief for patentholders. The Supreme Court in Schillinger v. United
States232 held that the Tucker Act did not waive sovereign immunity as
to government patent infringement because the Act explicitly set aside
“cases sounding in tort.”233 Schillinger conceived of infringement claims
as tortious in nature because patentees seek recovery for damages for
wrongful acts, as opposed to contractual claims involving a meeting of
the minds.234 Had the claims been contractual, the Tucker Act would
grant jurisdiction over those issues to the Court of Claims.235 The logical
implication of an infringing entity with sovereign immunity is that
patentholders had no remedy whatsoever.
It was this lack of remedy that spurred Congress to pass the 1910
Act.236 The 1910 Act gave patentholders the right to sue in the Court
of Claims “whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent
of the United States shall . . . be used by the United States without
license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use the same, such owner
may recover reasonable compensation . . . .”237 It is interesting to note
that this remedy came after Schillinger, because it leads to debate over
whether the 1910 Act was meant to overturn the Schillinger holding
that patents are not entitled to Takings Clause protection or whether
it was meant to provide a completely alternative remedy.238
The Supreme Court subsequently interpreted the 1910 Act to apply
only to the federal government; it did not provide cover for federal
contractors who infringed a patent in their work.239 This holding gener–
231. See id. (providing the Court of Claims with jurisdiction over “[a]ll claims
founded upon the Constitution of the United States or any law of
Congress . . . or upon any contract, express or implied . . . in cases not
sounding in tort.”).
232. 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
233. Id. at 168–69.
234. Id.
235. 24 Stat. at 505.
236. See Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesell-Schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 303–04
(1912) (explaining that the lack of remedy against federal patent infringe–
ment spurred the adoption of the 1910 Act).
237. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-305, 36 Stat. 851 (1910) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018)).
238. See infra notes 244–245 and accompanying text.
239. See William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. Int’l Curtis Marine
Turbine Co., 246 U.S. 28, 44–45 (1918) (holding that the 1910 Act did not
confer upon federal contractors the right to infringe patents on “the assum–
ption that the United States would be ultimately liable for the patent rights
which the contractors might elect to take”); see also Zoltek Corp. v. United
States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (describing the
William Cramp holding).
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ated concern among the Armed Forces that exposing contractors to
such litigation would harm military interests,240 so Congress amended
the 1910 Act to include coverage for inventions used or made “by or
for” the United States. 241 The last amendment to the infringement
statute came in 1949, 242 which codified the section into 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498, its current form.
Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 provides for “reasonable and entire com–
pensation” for federal government or federal contractor infringement of
a patent. It does lack elements typically associated with eminent
domain jurisprudence—such as a public use requirement 243 —which
could be an issue if the Supreme Court decides that patents are entitled
to Takings Clause protection. If the Court decides that Florida Prepaid
is still good law as to patents under the Due Process Clause, though,
“reasonable and entire compensation” is likely to be an adequate
remedy.244
On the other hand, Professor Mossoff argues that Congress
intended, through 28 U.S.C. § 1498, to grant jurisdiction to the Court
of Claims to hear patent infringement claims because Congress saw
government infringement as a taking.245 That means that even if § 1498
is an adequate remedy for most infringement cases under the Due
Process Clause, it may be used as evidence of Congress’s intent to adopt
a takings approach to patents. Mossoff acknowledges, however, that the
modern view has been that § 1498 is merely a discretionary policy
decision, not a constitutional mandate.246

VI. Patents as Public Franchises in Constitutional
Property Claims
In Oil States, the majority opinion takes a “public franchise”
approach to patents, arguing that they are entitled only to the rights

240. See Wood v. Atl. Gulf & Pac. Co., 296 F. 718, 720–21 (D. Ala. 1924)
(quoting a 1918 letter from Acting Navy Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt
expressing concern about William Cramp’s implications).
241. Act of July 1, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-182, 40 Stat. 704, 705 (1918).
242. Act of May 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-72, § 87, 63 Stat. 89, 102 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018)).
243. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1984) (describing
the “public use” requirement for eminent domain).
244. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
245. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 712–13 (arguing that the legislative history to
§ 1498 clearly establishes Congress’s intent to recognize patents as private
property).
246. Id. at 722.
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conferred by statute. 247 Though the Court expressly reserves the
question of whether patents are property rights for the Due Process or
Takings Clauses, the Florida Prepaid precedent strongly suggests that
the due process question is settled in favor of protection248—but the
Takings Clause question is far less certain. After all, just because a
property interest is entitled to protection under either the Due Process
Clause or the Takings Clause does not mean that it is entitled to
protection under both.249 The Takings Clause question is still very much
in doubt, given that the only Supreme Court precedent in that area is
dicta.250 Thus, the Oil States classification of a patent will likely come
into play in the Takings Clause analysis.
If—as Oil States holds—a patent is a public franchise and not a
traditional personal property right, then it is not clear how the property
right could rise to the level of “private property.” 251 The Fifth
Amendment explicitly protects “private property” from taking without
just compensation; 252 if the patent right is merely a public franchise
property right, it may not satisfy the “private property” definition.253
Even if conceived as a property right in the form of a franchise, it is
axiomatic in Supreme Court jurisprudence that not all property rights
are entitled to the “full panoply of constitutional remedies.”254
It is possible, though, that Oil States could be inapplicable where
government infringement is involved. Justice Thomas argued that inter
partes review evoked the public rights doctrine specifically because it
involved reconsidering the patent grant—and when the PTAB first
considers granting a patent, that involves a public franchise. 255
247. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1375 (2018).
248. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 642 (1999); see also supra text accompanying notes 114–116.
249. “The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal
rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should
have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal
discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be
guarded against.” Wachovia Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303,
319 (2006) (Ginsburg, J.) (quoting Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and
“Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale. L.J. 333, 337 (1933)).
250. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 708; see also supra text accompanying notes
134–136.
251. See Christy, Inc. v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 641, 660 (2019).
252. U.S. Const. amend. V.
253. Christy, 141 Fed. Cl. at 660.
254. See Isaacs, supra note 20, at 36.
255. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1373 (2018); supra text accompanying note 58.
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Government infringement or other takings-related acts would not meet
this same criteria. The idea that the only rights in patents—as a public
franchise—are those granted by statute,256 however, should overcome
that burden. The only statutory right to a remedy, then, would be the
existing statutory remedy for infringement—28 U.S.C. § 1498. Alterna–
tively, under the approach that the only rights in patents are those
conferred by statute, Congress could conceivably stipulate that patents
are entitled to Takings Clause protection, but Congress has thus far
evidenced no such intent.257
If the Takings Clause did apply to patents in any context,
additional problems arise. 258 First, there are several different lenses
through which courts could analyze a patent takings claim, which
complicates any attempt to apply the Takings Clause to patents.259
Government infringement, for example, has sometimes been described
as the “taking” of a license.260 This approach would broadly expand the
scope of federal patent infringement jurisprudence, given that every
instance of government infringement would be a taking. Additionally,
this may violate the Court’s Penn Central premise; arguing that each
infringement is the “taking” of a license is analogous to arguing that
the government has entirely devalued a section of your one parcel of
land. Given that a patentee in an infringement situation still retains
the right to exclude others, and simply loses the “parcel” of a license to
the federal government, the Court could reject arguments about
infringement involving the taking of a license.261
256. See supra Part II(B).
257. See Isaacs, supra note 20, at 41–42.
258. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 720–22 (noting that patentees may not often
be entitled to Takings Clause protection because patents only provide the
right to exclude).
259. See Storm, supra note 2, at 16–20 (proposing a multi-layered framework for
patent takings). See generally Cotter, supra note 45 (describing an “expan–
sive view,” a “middle view,” and a “narrow view” as to how government
uses of intellectual property could qualify as takings).
260. See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(describing the United States as a “compulsory, nonexclusive licensee,”
rather than an “ordinary infringer,” because of its eminent domain auth–
ority).
261. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978)
(explaining that eminent domain jurisprudence “does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses
[on] . . . the parcel as a whole . . . .”); Cotter, supra note 45, at 563
(“Most types of intellectual property are strongly nonrivalrous. The
government’s use of a patent . . . does not prevent the intellectual
property owner from simultaneously using the work . . . or from licensing
others to use it . . . . All that the intellectual property owner loses, except
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The applicability of the Takings Clause would be more complicated,
however, in forms of “takings” that do not involve infringement. 262
Though 28 U.S.C. § 1498 should suffice to cover situations of actual
infringement by the federal government or its contractors, it would not
appear to apply where Congress re-assigned or completely extinguished
an extant patent outside of the normal scope of the patent code. Such
actions would be closest to actual physical occupation or entirely
devaluing land under the Court’s eminent domain jurisprudence.
Though at least one court has held that there can be no “takings” claim
for inter partes review cancellation of a patent,263 the question has not
reached the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court.
Such Congressional action, though, would not involve a physical
intrusion, complicating the matter further. 264 Additionally, these
situations appear analogous to Congress’s authority to cancel other
public franchises, like bridges, without triggering Takings Clause
protections.265
A more likely analogy given the federal government’s infringing
activity is to regulatory takings. Under this view, patentees would be
restricted to only making Takings Clause claims when the government
infringement almost entirely devalues their patent, rather than just
depriving the patentee of a license.266 This is quite possible—the Court
in James v. Campbell was explicitly concerned that patentees could be
entirely deprived of all value in their patents when those patents related
to inventions that only governments can use.267
One commentator has argued that applying a regulatory takings
framework to patents could lead to actions against Congress for passing
statutes that devalue patents generally—such as making it harder to
sue for patent infringement. This may also counsel against applying the
Takings Clause in such a manner.268
in those rare circumstances in which government use destroys virtually all
of the property’s value, is some licensing revenue.”) (footnote omitted).
262. See Storm, supra note 2, at 16–20.
263. See Christy, Inc. v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 641, 658 (2019).
264. See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 721 (“Given its status as intellectual property,
a patent is nonrivalrous and nonexhaustive in nature. The government’s
unauthorized use of a patented invention, therefore, lacks the physical
dispossession that triggers a compensable taking of land.”) (footnotes
omitted).
265. See supra Part II(B)(1).
266. See Cotter, supra note 45, at 555 (explaining a “Narrow View” of patent
takings that would only trigger the Takings Clause if the government’s
use of it “virtually destroy[s]” the patent’s value).
267. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1888).
268. See Isaacs, supra note 20, at 2.
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Leaving aside the Takings Clause still leaves due process claims.
Again, Florida Prepaid seems to stand for the proposition that patents
are entitled to due process protection, but that does not necessarily
mean that patents are also entitled to Takings Clause protection.269 It
may be possible, however, to challenge Florida Prepaid’s holding that
patents are entitled to due process protection as property interests,
given that the Florida Prepaid Court engaged in relatively little
analysis of the patent right.270 This is a particularly salient point when
considering the subsequent Oil States decision holding that patents are
a public franchise restricted entirely by statutory grants.271
Notwithstanding potential challenges to Florida Prepaid’s patentsas-constitutional-property holding, any claimant alleging a deprivation
of due process with respect to federal government infringement on
patent rights would run into the Florida Prepaid analysis of the ade–
quacy of the available remedy—because mere deprivation of a property
interest does not mean that the property interest was unconstitutionally
deprived.272 The remedy available for federal patent infringement, 28
U.S.C. § 1498, is likely adequate to protect a patentholder’s interest.273
Under that provision, successful claimants are entitled to their “reason–
able and entire compensation” for federal infringement.274 Though the
statute lacks some of the traditional Takings Clause burdens on the
government such as proving a public use, 275 and could certainly be
improved by introduction of ex ante licensing requirements, the
availability of compensation—which can include attorney’s fees276—will
likely be held to operate as a sufficient remedy for federal infringement.
This is true especially because § 1498 covers infringement by federally
approved contractors, which provides an even broader base of possible
infringers.277 It is also not clear that the statute would even need to
269. Id. at 36–42 (analyzing cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly and arguing that
some property rights can be protected by the Due Process Clause but
not the Takings Clause).
270. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 642 (1999); see also supra note 114.
271. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1375 (2018).
272. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643.
273. See supra Part V.
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2018).
275. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (discussing public use
in the eminent domain context).
276. See, e.g., Hitkansut LLC v. United States, 142 Fed. Cl. 341, 355–56 (2019)
(awarding attorney’s fees as part of “reasonable and entire compensation”
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
277. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
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provide the same protections as the Takings Clause to satisfy due
process.
Any argument that the Takings Clause should not apply to patents
will have to overcome Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, where the Court held
that eminent domain jurisprudence could apply to trade secrets. 278
Because the Court found that state law was an adequate source from
which to draw a property interest under the Takings Clause,279 it is
possible that the Court could find sufficient property interests created
in the patent code to entitle patents to Takings Clause protection. Thus
far, however, Congress has evidenced no such intent to create property
interests in patents. This, coupled with the Oil States approach to
patents as entitled only to the rights granted by statute, should mean
that patents are sufficiently different from trade secrets to merit a
different outcome for patents.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s approach to patents as public franchises in
Oil States indicates that patents are not entitled to Takings Clause
protection, but the Florida Prepaid opinion is likely still valid as
establishing that patents may be protected by the Due Process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If patents only receive the
protections given by statute, then the only remedy available for federal
patent infringement is 28 U.S.C. § 1498, but Congress could add
protections by stipulating that patents are property for Takings Clause
purposes. For due process claims, the available remedy—again, 28
U.S.C. § 1498—is likely to satisfy due process concerns without further
safeguards.
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